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The Future of Value-Based Payment: A Road Map to 2030 
Abstract 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A decade after the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the vision of moving the U.S. health care system 
“from volume to value” has been partially realized, with few value-based payment initiatives 
systematically reducing spending or improving quality. While participation in value-based payments 
continues to grow, the adoption of advanced forms of value-based payment through alternative payment 
models lags behind both the goals set by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 2015 and the 
threshold required for widespread practice transformation. Furthermore, the complexity of the current 
suite of alternative payment models and allure of traditional fee-for-service prevent the widespread 
adoption of full risk-bearing contracts. The high costs of care with the impending insolvency of the 
Medicare trust fund, persistence of poor quality of care and health disparities along racial and 
socioeconomic lines, and mixed success of alternative payment models indicate the need for a revamped 
vision for the 2020s. 
The 2020s require a new strategy that moves from a short-term focus on testing new payment models to 
a long-term focus on expanding models that are most likely to generate substantial savings and improve 
quality. This white paper outlines a new direction for the federal government—primarily through the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—to chart over the next decade aimed at completing 
the transition to a health care system that pays for value and reduced health disparities, rather than high 
volumes of services. 
First, CMS must articulate a clear vision for the future of value-based payment. In particular, the vision 
must align across all publicly financed health care, driving change beyond Medicare and Medicaid. 
Second, CMS must dramatically simplify the current value-based payment landscape and engage late-
adopting providers. Third, for health systems already participating in value-based payment, CMS must 
accelerate the movement from upside-only shared savings to risk-bearing, population-based alternative 
payment models while curtailing the ability of providers to opt out of value-based payment altogether. 
Fourth, CMS must not only pull providers toward advanced alternative payment models, but also structure 
incentives to push providers away from fee-for-service payment. Finally, achieving health equity must be a 
central feature and goal of value-based payment. Taken together, these five recommendations provide a 
path toward widespread adoption and success of alternative payment models, producing better health 
outcomes for all Americans, reducing wasteful inefficiencies and health disparities, and more effectively 
stewarding taxpayer funds to support other national priorities 
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Key Terms  
Fee-for-service Negotiated or pre-specified unit prices for services, without any regard to quality or value. 
Value-based payment Payment (fee-for-service or otherwise) with some linkage to quality, value, or infrastructure. 
Alternative payment 
models (APMs) 
Advanced forms of value-based payment, in which providers take on substantial 
financial risk to deliver high-quality care at lower cost. 
Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs) 
An APM in which groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers 
are responsible for total cost of care for a population of Medicare beneficiaries. If 
total spending is below a pre-set benchmark and quality remains stable, 
providers share in the savings. In some tracks, ACOs may pay losses to Medicare 
if spending exceeds benchmarks. 
Bundled payments 
An APM in which doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers are paid a 
fixed price for an episode of care. Providers must cover costs above the target 
price, including those from complications and readmissions. Providers share in 
the savings if they keep costs below the target price while maintaining quality. 
Comprehensive Payment 
for Primary Care 
A primary care APM in which practices receive care management fees, 
performance-based incentive payments, and, in some cases, lump sum quarterly 






The Future of Value-Based Payment: A Road Map to 2030 
 
Executive Summary  
A decade after the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the vision of moving the U.S. health care system “from 
volume to value” has been partially realized, with few value-based payment initiatives systematically reducing 
spending or improving quality. While participation in value-based payments continues to grow, the adoption of 
advanced forms of value-based payment through alternative payment models lags behind both the goals set by 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 2015 and the threshold required for widespread practice 
transformation. Furthermore, the complexity of the current suite of alternative payment models and allure of 
traditional fee-for-service prevent the widespread adoption of full risk-bearing contracts. The high costs of care 
with the impending insolvency of the Medicare trust fund, persistence of poor quality of care and health 
disparities along racial and socioeconomic lines, and mixed success of alternative payment models indicate the 
need for a revamped vision for the 2020s.  
 
The 2020s require a new strategy that moves from a short-term focus on testing new payment models to a 
long-term focus on expanding models that are most likely to generate substantial savings and improve quality. 
This white paper outlines a new direction for the federal government—primarily through the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—to chart over the next decade aimed at completing the transition to a 
health care system that pays for value and reduced health disparities, rather than high volumes of services.  
 
First, CMS must articulate a clear vision for the future of value-based payment. In particular, the vision must 
align across all publicly financed health care, driving change beyond Medicare and Medicaid. Second, CMS 
must dramatically simplify the current value-based payment landscape and engage late-adopting providers. 
Third, for health systems already participating in value-based payment, CMS must accelerate the movement 
from upside-only shared savings to risk-bearing, population-based alternative payment models while curtailing 
the ability of providers to opt out of value-based payment altogether. Fourth, CMS must not only pull 
providers toward advanced alternative payment models, but also structure incentives to push providers away 
from fee-for-service payment. Finally, achieving health equity must be a central feature and goal of value-
based payment. Taken together, these five recommendations provide a path toward widespread adoption and 
success of alternative payment models, producing better health outcomes for all Americans, reducing wasteful 





Introduction: A Decade of Movement from Volume to Value  
Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) has sought to transform U.S. health care from a system that incentivizes volume to one that rewards 
value. A key part of this strategy has been shifting from fee-for-service (FFS) payment to mechanisms that link 
provider reimbursement to improved quality and reduced costs. In 2015, Health and Human Services (HHS) 
Secretary Sylvia Burwell publicly committed CMS to tying at least 90% of traditional Medicare fee-for-service 
payments to quality by 2018.1   
 
However, simply adding bonuses and penalties to fee-for-service payments is not enough to transform a 
system with historically high prices and inefficient care processes. Therefore, CMS has also developed 
advanced alternative payment models (APMs) that hold providers financially accountable for the quality and 
cost of care delivered to patients. These APMs include accountable care organizations (ACOs), episode-
based payment models, Comprehensive Primary Care models, and other arrangements. Beyond committing to 
tying 90% of traditional Medicare fee-for-service payments to quality, CMS also sought to have at least half of 
payments flowing through APMs by 2018. According to the latest available data, while CMS has successfully 
tied 90% of payments to value, only about 40% flowed through APMs.2 
 
However, the transition to a health care system that rewards value has slowed in recent years, and the promise 
of curtailing health care spending while also improving quality has remained elusive. Indeed, quality of care 
remains variable across health care settings with ongoing unnecessary utilization, low rates of compliance with 
recommended care, and inequities in health and health care. Meanwhile, though per-beneficiary spending 
growth in Medicare and Medicaid has slowed, aggregate spending continues to rise due to the aging 
population and expanded program eligibility. This will ultimately result in increasing per-enrollee costs3 and will 
contribute to the expected insolvency of the Medicare Trust Fund in 2024. In addition, without increased 
adoption of alternative payment models into the commercial market, where per-enrollee costs continue to 
outstrip inflation and wage growth, health care spending will continue to grow.4 The combination of quality and 






A Decade of Innovation  
The 2010s produced many value-based programs, including Medicare’s flagship Shared Savings Program 
(MSSP) ACOs established under the ACA. Others were established through regulation, primarily by CMS’s 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI), which has developed and tested dozens of alternative 
payment models. Commercial payers have followed Medicare’s lead, launching APMs with tailored episode 
and population-based models. After a decade of innovation, it is time to take stock of how successful these 
efforts have been in transforming health care payment and delivery.  
 
Where We Are Now: Adoption of Value-Based Payment  
The wide variety of current payment models may be categorized along a continuum, from legacy fee-for-
service to global capitated payment. The Health Care Payment Learning & Action Network (HCP-LAN) 
defines four broad categories of payment (adapted in Table 1).2 Efforts to promote value-based payment focus 
on moving as many providers and as much revenue as possible to the third and fourth categories. 
 
Table 1. Provider Payment Types, Adapted From HCP-LAN 
 Definition Example 
Category 1 Fee-for-service with no link to quality or value Physician professional fees 
Category 2 Fee-for-service linked to quality and value Pay-for-performance (e.g., MIPS) and infrastructure improvement payments 
Category 3 
Alternative payment models built on a fee-
for-service architecture that hold providers 
financially accountable for performance 
Shared savings (e.g., MSSP ACOs) 
 
Episode-based payments for procedures (e.g., 
BPCI)  
Comprehensive Primary Care Plus (CPC+) Track 1  
Category 4 
Alternative payment models using 
population-based payment, with 
safeguards against limiting necessary care 
Global capitated budgets (e.g., integrated delivery 
systems)  
 
Comprehensive Primary Care Plus (CPC+) Track 2 
 




In 2018, fee-for-service with no link to quality or value still accounted for nearly 40% of all insurer payments, 




Advantage have had more success in moving away from fee-for-service, although just a small fraction of these 
payments is in APMs with population-based payments.  
 
Table 2. Share of Payments Made, by Payer and Payment Category (2018)  
 
Fee-for-service, not 
linked to quality or 
value 
Fee-for-service, 
linked to quality or 
value 





Overall 39.1% 25.1% 30.7% 5.1% 
Medicare 10.2% 48.9% 36.5% 4.4% 
Medicare 
Advantage 39.5% 6.9% 36.4% 17.2% 
Medicaid 66.1% 10.6% 17.4% 5.9% 
Commercial  55.7% 14.2% 27.6% 2.5% 
 
Furthermore, progress remains uneven across providers, geographic areas, and different APMs.  In Medicare, 
most provider participation in population-based models is concentrated in the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program (MSSP). In 2020, roughly 500 MSSP ACOs served over 11 million Medicare beneficiaries (about 20% 
of all enrollees). MSSP participation is lower in many southern states and rural areas more broadly (Figure 1). 
While patients in ACOs tend to have a higher clinical risk, providers in communities serving populations with 
social risk factors are less likely to participate in ACOs.5, 6 This may be, in part, because care for populations 
with high social risk is typically concentrated within a subset of providers, such as Federally Qualified Health 
Centers (FQHCs). More troublingly, some ACO models may emphasize reducing wasteful utilization, but for 






Figure 1. Percent of Medicare Population in an ACO by Hospital Referral Region (2019) 
 
“Spread of ACOs And Value-Based Payment Models In 2019: Gauging the Impact of Pathways to Success,” 
Health Affairs Blog, October 21, 2019. DOI: 10.1377/hblog20191020.962600 
   
Similarly, most episode-based payment in Medicare is concentrated in the Bundled Payments for Care 
Improvement (BPCI) Advanced program. In the first performance year of BPCI Advanced (2018-2019), 22% of 
eligible hospitals and 23% of eligible clinicians participated in the program, which paid for 16% of potential 
episodes. While these adoption rates were higher than the previous iterations of BPCI, most hospitals that 
expressed interest did not ultimately enroll. BPCI Advanced hospitals were more likely to be urban, larger, and 
non-profit.7 Therefore, to the extent there are improvements in quality or efficiency, patients in rural areas with 
smaller health systems may be left behind.   
 
While adoption of APMs has increased over time, many clinicians remain suspicious and hesitant to participate 
in any value-based payment.8 Most providers who do participate in value-based payment choose arrangements 
without downside financial risk, rather than making the jump to advanced APMs. In 2020, 37% of Medicare 
MSSP ACOs took on downside risk, up from less than 10% in 2017.9, 10 In 2021, 41% of MSSP ACOs appear to 





Where We Are Now: Efficacy of Value-Based Payment and Health 
Disparities  
The past decade of experimentation with APMs has had successes and failures. But it has provided proof-of-
concept that if designed well, APMs are capable of driving cost savings and value improvements. There have 
been notable successes with the more advanced models that shift greater accountability onto providers, 
particularly those that do so over longer time horizons. Critics of value-based payment argue the movement is 
largely a disappointment, with only a small number reducing costs for Medicare, and many generating 
substantial losses.12 Observers are right to note that the current APM landscape includes many 
underperforming models, which have failed to produce the desired practice transformation. However, a decade 
of middling results does not imply that CMS should abandon value-based payment. The decade of 
experimentation has produced the necessary knowledge to design and implement APMs to transform health 
care delivery. We must build upon the most successful APMs and phase out those that have not delivered on 
their promise.    
 
To date, the savings and quality gains from alternative payment models have been inconsistent and modest 
(Table 3).13-24 Bundled payment models have produced modest per-episode savings for surgical procedures, 
most notably lower extremity joint replacements. Bundled payments have produced smaller savings for select 
medical conditions, such as congestive heart failure, and no savings for other conditions, such as cancer and 
acute myocardial infarctions. There is no clear evidence of improvements to health equity.  
 
Table 3. Broad State of Evidence from Alternative Payment Models 





Savings Program)  
Gross savings of 1% to 4%, 
increasing as years in ACO 
increase. 
 
Net savings to Medicare of <1% 
per beneficiary after paying out 






experience, and care 
coordination. 
Providers in communities 
serving low-income and 
minority populations less 
likely to participate. 
 










Varies by condition and 
procedure. 
 
1.5-2% per-episode gross savings 
for some surgical episodes (e.g., 
hip and knee replacements), but 
Varies by condition 
and procedure. 
 
Some evidence of 
improved functional 
status, no change in 
mortality, 
Hospitals caring for 
vulnerable groups less likely 
to receive shared savings. 
Some data suggesting 
populations with social risk 





Care for Joint 
Replacement)  
no net savings to Medicare after 
paying bonuses. 
 
Smaller savings for some medical 
conditions (e.g., congestive heart 








and CPCI+)  
No savings to Medicare. Some evidence of 
improved quality and 
reduced ED use   
Practices located in 
wealthier, highly educated 
areas are more likely to join. 
Medicare 
Advantage  
Some evidence Medicare 
Advantage has lower per-
beneficiary spending, but 
Medicare payments to Medicare 
Advantage plans remain high. 
Evidence of improved 
quality and reduced 
utilization. 
Mixed evidence.  Racial 
minorities may have 
improved access to 
screening under Medicare 
Advantage, but other 
evidence shows higher 
readmission rates.   
    
Population-based ACOs have generated modest per-beneficiary savings, with improvements along several 
quality dimensions. Evaluations suggest that physician-led ACOs have produced greater savings than hospital-
led ACOs by reducing hospitalizations, and these savings increase the longer participants remain in the 
program. Hospital-led ACOs face conflicting incentives: lost admission revenues wipe out the shared savings 
earned through reducing hospitalizations. Therefore, hospital-led ACOs have focused on reducing post-acute 
care spending. While models targeting high-cost populations (e.g., those with end-stage renal disease) have 
generated the most savings, some evidence suggests that this is attributable to risk selection and regression to 
the mean. While evidence suggests some forms of commercial and Medicaid ACOs can reduce cost and 
improve quality, overall, there is much less evidence related to commercial and Medicaid ACOs.25, 26 
 
With a small number of exceptions, value-based payment has yet to improve (or even explicitly address) access 
to care or health outcomes for populations with social risk factors, including racial and ethnic minorities, rural 
populations, and individuals with disabilities. Despite a growing recognition of these health care disparities, they 
persist across all payers. In most cases, CMS has focused on monitoring the unintended effects of value-based 
payment among populations with social risk factors. But the persistence of health inequities and disparities 
indicate systemic bias and underperformance in the health care system, and value-based payment must address 
those issues as key drivers of access and quality. To achieve health equity, value-based payment must directly 




with financial outcomes. The COVID-19 pandemic’s disproportionate impact on low-income and minority 
communities underscores the need to make equity a core focus of value-based payment.  
 
Challenges Remain for the Future of Value-Based Payment 
What have we learned from this decade of innovation? While the last decade of APM experimentation includes 
both successes and failures, there are some lessons about what works. Some bundled-payment programs and 
ACOs have proven capable of reducing costs and improving the value of care delivered. Programs that use 
two-sided risk (i.e., shared savings and losses) appear to have the greatest impact.27 Successful value-based 
payment transitions take time; the savings and practice transformations from APMs take years of experience 
and investment to pay off.24 For independent physician groups and providers unwilling to take on value-based 
payment on their own, conveners with greater risk appetite and experience in value-based payment may be 
useful shepherds.  
 
Underperforming models yield important insights. For example, alternative payment models must focus on 
optimizing shared decision-making tools and health IT infrastructure. Generous fee-for-service payment blunts 
the adoption of and effect of APMs, and federal efforts to reduce the draw of fee-for-service have so far been 
underpowered for the task. Therefore, the next decade of payment transformation must focus on expanding 
the most effective APMs that utilize two-sided risk, engaging more providers, and retaining current APM 
participants while graduating them to high-powered programs.   
 
There are several challenges to these goals. The extensive administrative complexity of the value-based 
payment landscape remains a significant barrier to participating in APMs and to evaluating each model. 
Traditional fee-for-service remains alluringly profitable for providers, creating ambivalence for those weighing 
the tradeoffs of investing in traditional vs. risk-bearing business models and enabling late adopters to “wait out” 
payer interest in APMs. Many providers on the road to value-based payment seem unable or unwilling to make 
the transition from upside risk-only to fully accountable care. Advanced models have not been developed or 
implemented with a focus on health equity. Going forward, CMS must confront these challenges with a 






Goals for the 2020s: Articulate a Clear Vision for the Future of 
Value-Based Payment Across All Publicly Financed Health Care   
Over the past decade, CMS and CMMI have focused on experimentation, generating dozens of alternative 
payment models with hundreds of tracks. It is time for CMS to lead with a strategic vision for the U.S. health 
care system and a publicly available path to executing that vision, as well as a carefully managed, 
straightforward, and sustainable APM portfolio.   
 
The Case for an Overarching Framework  
Excess experimentation has costs. Many APMs overlap both at the provider and beneficiary level, sometimes 
competing with each other. For providers not yet engaged in any value-based payment, the increasingly 
complex APM landscape dissuades adoption. Complexity encourages providers to chase small pools of shared 
savings, rather than systematically transform their practice. Overlapping models make it difficult to parse 
individual model effects on cost and quality, frustrating efforts to identify and expand the highest-performing 
models. With little guidance on the types of value-based models CMS will sustain over the long term, health 
systems are unsure of how to invest for optimal transformation and return on investment. Over the next 
decade, providers need guidance and assistance, not experiments. Instead of a narrow focus on individual 
models, CMS must begin to evaluate regularly the effect of the whole APM portfolio against expectations, 
within a guiding framework.  
 
A Proposed Path Forward   
CMS must articulate a vision for health care delivery and payment for 2030 that includes a long-term plan for 
the evolution of APMs, the coordination of models’ financial designs, and mandatory participation that moves 
to eliminate risk-free fee-for-service arrangements.  A clear strategy and set of goals would allow CMS to slow 
the introduction of new models, evaluate the projected and observed performance of existing models, and 
phase out underperforming initiatives. The framework should map different models to provider types (e.g., 





 “Medicare Payment Reform’s Next Decade: A Strategic Plan For The Center For Medicare And Medicaid 
Innovation,” Health Affairs Blog, December 18, 2020. DOI: 10.1377/hblog20201216.672904 
 
As illustrated above, for prospectively attributed beneficiaries, groups of providers could be accountable for 
total cost of care (through population-based payment via a health system, an ACO, or another convener), with 
procedure-based specialists paid through bundled payments. Primary care providers could be paid under 
advanced primary care models that include capitated fees for care management activities. Benchmarks for 
episode and populated-based payment could be based on average costs in a market, rather than on each 
provider’s past performance. Mandatory population-based payments would be the linchpin of this strategy, 
because they can mitigate risk selection and promote care coordination.  
 
Improving model performance will likely require provider competition at the market level, which in turn 
demands substantial reforms to performance benchmarking. The current approach to generating cost and 
quality baselines uses historical provider performance, with regular re-balancing. This mechanism generates a 
“race to the bottom” and penalizes providers that were already efficient. In contrast, setting performance 
baselines based on regional trends generates stronger incentives for practice transformation with transparent 
goals. However, regional benchmarking is only possible if CMS puts a greater emphasis on mandatory 










CMS Needs to Manage Its Portfolio Strategically 
To support its strategic vision, CMS should bring a portfolio-based approach to its value-based payment 
initiatives. The portfolio approach treats new payment models as a series of investments across APM programs, 
with specific allotments based on desired high-level goals, such as reducing per-beneficiary costs, improving 
value, and addressing health equity. Such a division of investments would guide how CMS allocates resources 
and measures success. The benefits to a long-term portfolio approach are manifold. First, a long-term 
commitment to a specific set of investments helps guard against shifting political goals. Second, it provides 
clarity to providers about the types of value-based program initiatives that are most suitable for investment. 
Finally, it allows for a clear accounting of success and failures in value-based payment, separating wheat from 
chaff.  
 
As an illustration, CMS could allot 40% of its APM portfolio (measured either in investment dollars or number 
of participating providers or beneficiaries) to a selection of models that are most likely to produce significant 
value improvements and 30% to programs aimed at improving outcomes for populations with social risk factors. 
A fifth of the portfolio could focus on novel experiments that are not payment models, but can still yield 
savings (e.g., addressing prescription drug costs). A tenth of the portfolio could aim to reduce out-of-pocket 
costs. Furthermore, health equity should be considered across all portfolio areas. Such a pre-determined 
allocation would work in parallel with the larger strategic vision for national practice transformation, and it could 
be adapted based on the evolution of evidence for APMs.  
 
Goals for the 2020s: Simplify the Value-Based Payment Landscape, 
Reduce Administrative Barriers for Late-Adopters, and Graduate 
Providers to Advanced Risk-Bearing Arrangements   
Accelerating the transition to value-based payment requires both drawing in late adopters and moving current 
program participants to higher-risk APM contracts. To expand and entrench APMs, CMS must focus on 
aligning APMs across payers, simplifying the administration of APMs, reforming the way performance 
benchmarks are set, requiring participation in APMs when possible, and reducing the appeal of traditional fee-
for-service when it is not.  
 
Pulling Providers in Through Alignment of APM Goals Across Payers 
Adoption and coordination of APMs across payers would have significant benefits by increasing providers’ total 




transformation. However, HHS has not adequately promoted APM adoption beyond Medicare. Over the next 
decade, policymakers should promote national transformation and alignment by leveraging the full range of 
federally funded health care programs.  
 
The private sector accounts for the largest share of national health care spending due to its high 
reimbursement rates. However, as shown in Table 2, commercial insurers have been slow to shift to value-based 
payment. For APMs to be successful, they must be aligned and harmonized across payers, service lines, and 
health plans. The federal government and CMS can lead this movement by aligning value-based payment in 
public programs with those in private programs that receive federal subsidies. This includes Medicare, 
TRICARE, the Veterans Health Administration, the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program, commercial 
plans sold on ACA exchanges, Medicaid, and managed care in both Medicare and Medicaid. For example, 
HHS should require that insurance plans sold on the ACA exchanges commit to similar APM adoption and 
structure as Medicare in order to draw premium subsidies. Similarly, Medicaid managed care organizations 
must use APMs in order to draw federal funds, and Medicare Advantage bids should be contingent on a 
meaningful percentage of the plan’s provider network participating in APMs.   
 
While the government may move many payers in similar directions, it must balance harmonization with being 
overly prescriptive. Medicaid, Medicare, and commercial insurance markets serve different populations, which 
may require different spending priorities and quality metrics. Aligning goals across programs should be flexible 
enough to allow these differences to emerge within a specified payment structure. However, aligning goals for 
APMs should not further entrench inequities by taking as a given that quality outcomes should be worse for 
populations with high social risks. Therefore, CMS should spearhead the development of multi-stakeholder 
standards, with template models (e.g., surgical bundles and capitated primary care programs) and adaptations 
for different populations, setting realistic goals without entrenching current inequities. Where appropriate, it 
should promote state or regional multi-payer models that can push providers in a coordinated direction. The 
overall goal is to increase the share of revenue tied to quality past the point of no return, which requires 
commercial buy-in.  
 
Pulling Providers in Through Administrative Simplification  
CMS must also simplify the administrative burden of alternative payment models. As noted, regional 
benchmarking can achieve substantial simplification for providers. Additionally, APMs must lock in providers 




of providers participating in APMs and beneficiaries attributed to APMs, creating few incentives for providers 
to make long-term investments in efficiency. In contrast, long-term contracts—such as five-year agreements—
signal a commitment to program success from CMS, and encourage providers to make greater technical and 
programmatic investments in early years, with expected savings accruing in later years. Long-term contracts 
should include multi-year beneficiary attribution—unless beneficiaries opt out or move—which allows providers 
to cement care relationships and truly reap the returns on care management investments. Along with long-term 
contracts and mandatory participation, CMS should prioritize identifying and implementing technical changes 













Pulling Providers in Through Mandatory Participation in APMs  
CMS must move away from voluntary provider participation in APMs, and work with providers and conveners 
to implement mandatory participation whenever feasible. The last decade has demonstrated bipartisan support 
for many mandatory programs, which have at least four advantages. First, mandatory participation simplifies 
the adoption of new payment models for providers and produces fair competition when benchmarks are set at 
the regional level. Second, mandatory programs mitigate undesirable dynamics that occur when markets 
segment into value-based and fee-for-service providers, such as risk selection of patients by providers 
participating in APMs. Third, they are the most efficient way to bring in late adopters. Finally, they allow for 
better control over evaluation, which in turn produces robust results, allowing the best versions of models to 




• Link directly to provider EMRs, allowing for:  
o Automated risk adjustment by pulling directly from technical 
documentation (e.g., lab results) 
o Automation of prior authorization requirements  
o Removal of manual risk coding   
o Automated care protocol submission  
• Provide technical assistance to upgrade and integrate EMRs  




Pulling Providers in by Reducing the Draw of Fee-for-Service  
In some cases, requiring participation in APMs is not possible. In those cases, increasing the voluntary adoption 
of risk-bearing APMs requires reducing the attractiveness of fee-for-service arrangements. First, CMS must re-
evaluate the current physician fee schedule, which is biased towards procedures, overvalues several specialty 
procedure codes, and undervalues primary care. CMS must reprice the most used billing codes based on value, 
adjusting payments based on actual work time as documented in established research. CMS must also 
rebalance fees paid for inpatient hospital diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and medical supplies (e.g., oxygen 
and blood).  
 
The impact of these reforms would reverberate throughout the private market.  
Negotiations between commercial payers and providers use CMS fees as a reference point, often reflecting 
Medicare fees with relative multipliers. Therefore, rebalancing the CMS fee schedule will not only pull 
providers to APMs within Medicare, but it will also improve the capacity of private payers to engage in APMs 
with health systems and physicians.   
 
CMS can also leverage consumer demand to reduce the attractiveness of fee-for-service, driving beneficiaries 
to providers participating in APMs, and, more importantly, to high-performing providers. For example, CMS 
could offer greater flexibility for telehealth waivers for providers in APMs and reduce patient cost-sharing for 
specialists who utilized bundled payments. These mechanisms would discourage continued reliance on 
traditional fee-for-service by making voluntary participation in APMs more economically attractive, which will 
encourage broad practice transformation.  
 
Goals for the 2020s: Value-Based Payment Focused on Equity and 
Populations with Social Risk Factors  
Far too often, the design of value-based contracts fails to account for health inequities or the possible effects of 
value-based payment on health disparities. With a few exceptions, such as the ACO Investment Model, most 
alternative payment models do not have an explicit goal of reducing health disparities. As a result, APMs may 
penalize practices if they care for patients with high social risk. Rather than targeting health equity, health 
disparities are considered as an afterthought in the evaluation, with monitoring to make sure spending 
reductions and quality improvement do not inadvertently worsen access and care of populations with social risk 
factors. Going forward, APMs should proactively promote equity with design decisions that treat reducing 




Improving Health Equity is a Goal of Value-Based Payment  
Several mechanisms can tie alternative payment models to health equity. In most cases, APMs can include 
explicit, direct funding that targets the care of populations with social risk factors, including funding for 
community health workers, community-based services, and teams that integrate health and social services. 
APMs can require participants to screen for social risk factors, track those data in electronic health records, and 
address those risk factors. Stratifying outcomes by race or other sources of social risk would allow CMS to tie 
shared savings bonuses to reducing disparities, publicly reporting those data and rewarding providers that close 
gaps. Consistently implementing these types of reforms across APMs in Medicare, Medicaid, and ACA 
exchange plans would offer providers a meaningful business case for addressing disparities.  
 
In addition to specific financial incentives, there are also several non-financial policies CMS can put in place to 
address health equity. For example, Medicare and other federal payers can require that ACOs produce equity 
impact statements that outline the current state of health equity in the beneficiary population, and how the 
ACO plans to reduce disparities in outcomes for populations with social risk factors. Impact statements should 
include measurable goals, clear metrics for success, and a commitment to making this information publicly 
available. CMS should also improve its approach to measuring social risk, which may require intra-agency 
coordination to develop new standards for data collection and measure definitions. Furthermore, CMS must 
lead the development of validated measures of health equity, which are scarce. Finally, all publicly reported 
patient outcomes, such as readmission rates, should be stratified by social risk factors. These reforms would also 
reduce the likelihood that providers in APMs might avoid caring for populations with social risk factors.  
 
Integrating Social Services into Health Care Delivery, With a Focus on Medicaid  
Ultimately, patients’ outcomes are influenced by more factors beyond health care services. Unstable housing, 
food insecurity, limited educational attainment, and poverty drive poor health outcomes. Policymakers can use 
APMs and the full suite of federally financed health care to encourage providers to integrate health care 
delivery with social services that address needed housing, food, and transportation, whether delivered by states, 
the federal government, or independent non-profits.  
 
Thus far, CMS has taken a limited approach to addressing social determinants of health, such as allowing 
Medicare Advantage plans to pay for food and transportation services. Over the next decade, across all APMs, 
CMS must explicitly require providers to connect beneficiaries to other social support programs for which they 




The largest opportunity to do so lies in Medicaid, but these efforts should not be limited to Medicaid. CMS 
should provide clear guidance that allows Medicare, Medicaid (beyond the use of waivers), and Medicaid 
managed care organizations to spend federal funding on social supports—either directly or through contracted 
agreements with social service providers—and to include capitated payment to providers for care management 
activities. 
 
Allowing for greater spending on social supports through federal insurance will also require greater 
accountability. Specifically, Medicaid must become a one-stop shop for all means-tested social welfare 
programs. Federal funding for state Medicaid programs and Medicaid managed care organizations should be 
contingent on actively enrolling beneficiaries and their dependents in other programs for which they qualify, 
such as housing vouchers, supplemental nutrition assistance (SNAP), or Head Start. CMS should provide 
technical assistance to states to implement and support these efforts.  
 
Conclusion  
In the decade since the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the health care system has reached a series of 
important milestones in its shift to paying for value. Led by CMS, a growing share of payers have moved away 
from outmoded fee-for-service payment. More providers than ever before are engaged in some form of 
quality-linked payment, and a smaller cadre have begun experimenting with advanced forms of population-
based payment and large-scale practice transformation. 
 
We now need a more focused, whole-of-government push toward a high-quality, efficient system. The 
persistence of health disparities, uneven quality, and continued rise of health care costs, and the concomitant 
threat to federal and state budgets, requires renewed focus on spreading the adoption of advanced forms of 
alternative payment models. These models must move from experimentation to an entrenched, nationwide 
standard.  
 
The past decade of experimentation shows that alternative payment models as currently implemented are not 
driving large-scale, systemic change. But a careful study of the lessons from both successful and 
underperforming models suggests that properly designed APMs can yield improvements in value through cost 
reductions and quality improvements. The next decade must put those lessons into practice by engaging late 
adopters, ramping up already adopted and successful APMs, driving payment and practice transformation in 
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